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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-CONTAINED REGIMES 
AS AN OBSTACLE TO UN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Carmen Draghici 
 
 
Whilst the absence of a coherent normative and institutional hierarchy has 
characterized the international community of states at all times, until recently 
the potential conflicts arising from the fragmentation of international law were 
mostly relegated to the realm of academic debate.1 Where they did arise, they 
typically involved divergent (substantial/procedural) solutions provided for by 
                                                 
1
 On hierarchies in international law see e.g. P Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law?’ (1983) 77 AJIL 413; B Oxman, ‘Complementary Agreements and 
Compulsory Jurisdiction’ (2001) 95 AJIL 277; D Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in 
International Law’ (2006) 100 AJIL 291. On the topic of fragmentation and references to the 
scholarly debate see M Koskenniemi and P Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law. 
Postmodern Anxieties?’ (2002) 15 Leiden JIL 553; G Hafner, ‘Pros And Cons Ensuing from 
Fragmentation of International Law’ [2004] 25 Mich.J.Int’l L. 849; A Fischer-Lescano and G 
Teubner, ‘Regime-collisions. The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law’ [2004] 25 Mich.J.Int’l L. 999. The consequences of the proliferation of international law 
sources has been examined by a study group of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
chaired by Martti Koskenniemi in ‘Fragmentation of International Law…Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi’ (13 April 2006) 
UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (hereafter Koskenniemi Report). The ILC adopted a shorter text 
containing ‘Conclusions o the Work of the Study Group on Fragmentation’ in ‘Report of the 
International LawCommission on the Work of its 58th Session’ (1 May-9 June and 31 July-11 
August 2006) UN Doc A/61/10 (2006) (hereafter ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation). See M 
Matheson, ‘The Fifty-seventh Session of the International Law Commission’ (2006) 100 AJIL 
416, 423 ff.  
 regional or sectoral agreements on the same matter.2 The United Nations (UN) 
Charter norms remained immune from any balancing against particular norms, 
by virtue of the hierarchical relationship established by Article 103 and of the 
general acceptance that they codify the international public order. The practical 
consequences of the fragmentation, and in particular the regionalization, of 
international law are becoming, nonetheless, appreciable in the light of a series 
of recent legal developments that redefine the relationship between the UN and 
the European Union (EU). Such developments were driven by the discrepancy 
between UN sanctions targeting individuals suspected of terrorist links and the 
concerns of EU institutions over the infringement of fundamental human rights. 
The Kadi ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)3 of 3 December 20084 
and its replications, as well as the subsequent Council Regulation 1286/2009 of 
22 December 2009,5 have challenged the decades-long assumption of the pre-
eminence of UN obligations (in particular under Security Council Chapter VII 
resolutions) over any other international agreements. Starting from these 
                                                 
2
 See the Mox Plant example of overlapping between functional and geographic special regimes 
in Koskenniemi Report (n 1) 12-14, [10]-[13]. See also Shelton (n 1) 293. 
3
 The Lisbon Treaty, in force since 1 December 2009, renamed the European courts as ‘Court of 
Justice’ (formerly ‘European Court of Justice’) and ‘General Court’ (formerly ‘Court of First 
Instance’). For the purpose of clarity, this chapter uses the pre-Lisbon denominations. 
4
 Joined Cases C-402P & C-415/05P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European 
Communities [2008] ECR I-6351. On the judgment see e.g. C Draghici, ‘Suspected Terrorists’ 
Rights Between the Fragmentation and Merger of Legal Orders: Reflections in Margin of the 
Kadi ECJ Appeal Judgment’ (2009) 8 (4) Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 627; ‘Plate Tectonics 
in Luxembourg: the Ménage à Trois Between EC Law, International Law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights Following the UN Sanctions Cases’ (2009) 46 (1) CMLRev 73; 
Pe De Sena & MC Vitucci, ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: Between 
Dedoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values (2009) 20 (1) EJIL 193, 221-8. 
5
 Council Regulation (EU) 1286/ 2009 amending Regulation (EC) 881/2002 imposing certain 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama 
bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban [2009] OJ L346/42. 
 momentous developments, this chapter seeks to address  major quandaries in 
current international law: what relevance and authority does UN law retain in 
relation to self-contained regimes? Is UN law still conceived as hierarchically 
superior in case of contrasting obligations, or do the ordinary rules on conflict 
of norms (i.e. norms of equivalent status) apply?  
 
Section I discusses the evidence supporting the wide acceptance of the UN 
Charter as the constitutional framework of the international community. 
Against this background, Section II examines the emergence of the Kadi 
doctrine rejecting the uncritical execution of UN decisions in the name of non-
derogable EU values. The judicial echoes of the Kadi ruling, in particular 
subsequent judgments of both the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
upholding Kadi are also analyzed. The institutional follow-up, most notably the 
recent EU Council regulation reforming the implementation of UN terrorist 
sanctions, is addressed in Section III, with a focus on the impact of EU’s 
conditional acceptance of UN supremacy upon actual global governance. 
Section IV explores the attempt of the UN Security Council to address the latest 
challenges to its authority by adopting Resolution 1904 (2009) of 17 December 
2009,6 which introduces an Ombudsperson at the core of a new delisting 
procedure for terrorism suspects. The conclusions highlight the difficulty of 
achieving UN global governance as long as conspicuous groups of states 
establish highly homogeneous forms of community on a regional basis and their 
                                                 
6
 UNSC Res 1904 (17 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904. 
 fundamental rules collide with UN commandments. I argue that the 
hierarchically superior nature of UN Charter obligations at variance with lex 
specialis finds an exception in the constitutional norms of subsystems such as 
the EU. Hence the necessity for value-oriented UN reform in order to avoid the 
risks posed by self-contained regimes to the uniform application of UN law and 
the recognition of UN primacy itself. 
 
 
I. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: A CONSTITUTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY? 
  
 
The concept of UN global governance is premised on the assumption that the 
community of states is evolving towards an international constitutional order, 
centred on the norms enshrined in the UN Charter and on the UN institutional 
structure.7 The UN Charter may be prima facie construed as a constitution of 
the world community, insofar as its main principles and purposes (including the 
prohibition on the threat or use of force, the obligation concerning the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, co-operation and friendly relations amongst states and 
                                                 
7
 On UN and the constitutionalization of international law see e.g. P-M Dupuy, ‘The 
Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Planck 
Yearbook of International Law 1; B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of 
the International Community’ (1998) 36 Colum.J.Transnat’l L. 529; S Kirchner, ‘Relative 
Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension of International Law: A Place for Values in the 
International Legal System?’ (2004) 5 (1) German LJ 47; S Breau, ‘The Constitutionalisation of 
the International Legal Order’, (2008) 21(2) LJIL 545. 
 the promotion and protection of human rights) provide the framework of all 
international rules, and every other treaty regime must be consistent therewith. 
The ILC conclusions on the fragmentation of international law explicitly 
underscore the universally accepted ‘specialty’ of UN Charter norms.8  
 
Article 52 of the UN Charter suggests that the expansion of regionalism should 
be subordinated to UN law9 and state practice largely confirms this 
understanding. Express reference to the UN Charter is made in regional treaties, 
by which they acknowledge the Charter as a framework of international law and 
a source of legitimacy. One such example is the statute of the North-Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), which reaffirms in its Preamble the “faith in the 
purposes and principles of the Charter”, and establishes in Article 1 that the 
‘Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter…,to settle any…dispute…by 
peaceful means…and to refrain…from the threat or use of force … inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations’ (emphasis added). Moreover, Article 5 
of the NATO Treaty refers to the ‘right of … self-defence recognised by Article 
51 of the Charter’, though self-help is also a well-established institution of 
general international law.  
 
                                                 
8
 See ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1) [36]: ‘It is also recognized that the United 
Nations Charter enjoys special character owing to the fundamental nature of some of its norms, 
particularly its principles and purposes and its universal acceptance’. 
9
 See UN Charter Article 52: ‘Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations’. 
 The presumption of UN constitutionalism is further supported by the increasing 
tendency towards the overlapping of UN law and international law. This stems 
from the virtually universal UN membership, the expanding scope of 
multilateral law-making within the General Assembly as, a privileged forum for 
the negotiation of international treaties, the general recognition of the ‘soft law’ 
value of General Aseembly resolutions, and the codification of international 
law by the UN-established International Law Commission (ILC), resulting in 
international conventions or authoritative restatements of international norms.10  
 
More decisively, the constitutionalist view of the UN is predicated on the 
position occupied by the Charter in the hierarchy of international norms (other 
than jus cogens). This is mainly, though not exclusively, because of the 
supremacy clause in Article 103 of the Charter, establishing that in the event of 
a conflict between obligations under the Charter and obligations ‘under any 
other international agreement’, the former ‘shall prevail’. Despite the wording 
of the provision,11 the ILC suggested that Charter obligations ‘may also prevail’ 
                                                 
10
 See S Bleicher, ‘The Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions’ 
(1969) 63 (3) AJIL 444; C Joyner, ‘U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: 
Rethinking  the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm Creation’ (1981) 11 California Western ILJ 
445; B Sloan, ‘General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)’ (1987) 58 BYIL 
39; H Chodosh, ‘Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law’ 
(1991) 26 Texas ILJ 87; D Sheltone, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System (OUP, Oxford 2000); V Gowland-Debbas (ed), 
Multilateral Treaty-Making (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 2000). 
11
 The wording reflects the intention of the drafters, as proposals to include reference to ‘any 
international obligation’ were rejected at the San Francisco conference. See R Liivoja, ‘The 
Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 583. It can be 
argued, however, based on Articles 31 (3) (b) and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, that the travaux préparatoires constitute subsidiary means of interpretation, whereas 
‘subsequent practice’ belongs to the general rules of interpretation and, as such, should prevail. 
 over inconsistent custom, relying, significantly, on ‘the constitutional character 
of the Charter and the established practice of States and United Nations 
organs’.12 Regardless of the pre-eminence over custom, the subordination of 
any international agreement to the Charter undoubtedly confers on the latter a 
superior normative status.  
 
The exceptional standing of the Charter is also recognized by treaty law as 
codified by the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). The Preamble to the 1969 VCLT refers to ‘the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter’, and Article 30 (1) makes the rules 
on successive treaties on the same matter ‘subject to Article 103 of the Charter. 
Article 52 further stipulates that a ‘treaty is void if [concluded] by the threat or 
use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter’. Similarly, Article 65 (3) on procedures for treaty termination or 
annulment establishes that, in case of objections, ‘the parties shall seek a 
solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter’. The 1986 
VCLT includes analogous cross-references; most significantly, Article 30 
establishes that ‘in the event of a conflict between obligations under the Charter 
                                                 
12
 ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1) [35] (emphasis added). It is important to appreciate 
at the same time that, given the quasi-universal UN membership, the relationship with existing 
custom presents a theoretical rather than a practical interest. In the event that a norm based on 
the Charter were to conflict with a customary norm, the Charter-based norm would take 
precedence as lex specialis between the parties. It may be argued, however, that the formation 
of a new customary norm could prevail over from the Charter as lex posterior or ‘subsequent 
practice’ in relation to the Charter (for instance, should generalized practice and opinio juris 
arise in connection with humanitarian intervention, this may legitimize an exception from the 
prohibition of force in derogation of the Charter). 
 …and obligations under a treaty, the obligations under the Charter shall 
prevail’.  
 
Article 103 has thus been apparently incorporated into general treaty law.13 
Unlike any other treaty provision, a state cannot contract out of Article 103 of 
the UN Charter. This does not mean, however, that the norm contained in 
Article 103 has a peremptory character.14 Interestingly, the ILC Conclusions on 
Fragmentation, while recognizing the constitutional character of the Charter and 
its specialty, specify that a rule conflicting with Article 103 is  not applicable.15 
If Article 103 was intended as a peremptory norm, any inconsistent norm would 
be void altogether rather than not applicable. Also, the Koskenniemi Report 
found that in case of contrast with jus cogens, UN norms would be invalid.16 
The ILC Conclusions also admitted that, while Charter norms are universally 
accepted, and it is difficult to contemplate any contradiction with jus cogens, 
                                                 
13
 This is without prejudice to the legal position of the (few) non-UN states, and of states not 
parties to the VCTL, unless we agree that the 1969 VCTL has passed into customary law. In 
any event, as many as 110 States are currently bound by this instrument. See 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&
chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en> accessed 6 February 2010. Conversely, the 1986 VCLT 
between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations is not 
yet into force; so far it has received 41 instruments of ratification or accession. See 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXII
I-3&chapter=23&lang=en#1> accessed 6 February 2010.  
14
 The peremptory nature of Article 103 has found, however, some support in the scholarly 
literature. See B Conforti, Diritto Internazionale (ESI, Naples 2006) 166. There are two 
justifications available for the absolute impossibility to derogate from Article 103. One is that 
the rights of the remaining parties would be affected, since most UN obligations are of an 
integral nature, depending on compliance by all parties. Also, inter se agreements are prohibited 
in relation to those provisions derogation from which is incompatible with the effective 
execution of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 41 (1) VCLT 1969 addresses both 
situations. 
15
 ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1)[41]. 
16
 Koskenniemi Report (N 1)176-7 [346]. 
 problems may arise in connection with UN Security Council resolutions; the 
Security Council must act according to UN principles (Article 24.2 of the 
Charter), which include subsequently crystallized jus cogens.17 However, the 
concept of peremptory norm seems reserved to substantive international law, 
concerned with ethos and public policy (prohibition of genocide, torture and 
slavery); 18 norms touching upon the functioning of international law, no matter 
how essential (e.g. consuetudo est servanda  or pacta sunt servanda) are not 
peremptory, but their constitutional value is undeniable.19 Therefore, the fact 
that Article 103 is not jus cogens does not affect its quasi non-derogable nature 
(as between UN States, i.e. in practice under international law tout court).  
 
A further argument in support of UN constitutionalism is provided by 
international case-law, which upholds the view that the international 
community is verticalized around Article 103. Until the ECJ Kadi judgment in 
2008, this seemed to be the prevailing opinion of regional and domestic 
                                                 
17
 ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1) [40]. See also Judge Lauterpacht, Separate Opinion, 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Provisional Measures) [1993] ICJ Rep 
325 [100]. More generally on limits to UNSC discretion see C Draghici, ‘International 
Organisations and Anti-Terrorist Sanctions: No Accountability for Human Rights Violations?’ 
(2009) 2 (2) Critical Studies on Terrorism 293, 296-9. 
18
 See ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1)[33]. See also A Paulus, ‘Jus Cogens in a Time 
of Hegemony and Fragmentation. An Attempt at a Re-appraisal’ (2005) 74 Nordic JIL 297; 
Kirchner (n 7) 212; Shelton (n 1) 303-17. 
19
 It is possible to derogate from custom through a treaty (derogation from consuetudo est 
servanda , inter partes), but not from jus cogens. Also, a treaty in conflict with another treaty 
will not be void: conflict-of-law principles will apply where possible (lex posterior, lex 
specialis), otherwise issues of responsibility will arise, but the validity of the treaty will not be 
questioned.  
 courts.20 This was, in particular, the stance of the CFI in the Yusuf and Al-
Barakaat21 and Kadi22 decisions of 21 September 2005, subsequently 
confirmed in the Ayadi23 and Hassan24 decisions of 12 July 2006. All these 
rulings regarded the implementation by EU institutions and Member States of 
UN-imposed sanctions against individuals suspected of (association with) 
terrorism (assets freeze, travel ban).25 A list of suspected individuals and 
corporations is drawn up by the Sanctions Committee26 following proposals by 
member states. The submission of listing proposals is not contingent upon any 
domestic criminal charge or conviction, as the measures are allegedly 
preventative rather than punitive. Because the mechanism relies on the surprise 
effect, suspects are not afforded a prior hearing. However, the mechanism 
guarantees no right to defence even after the measure has been implemented. At 
the outset, delisting was possible only if the state of residence or nationality 
undertook negotiations with the designating state or addressed the Sanctions 
Committee. Currently, an individual may file a delisting petition with the Focal 
point for delisting established pursuant to Resolution 1730 (2006) but re-
                                                 
20
 On the judicial trend pre-dating the ECJ Kadi judgement see, e.g. Draghici (n 17) 300-3. 
21
 Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533. 
 
22
 Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649. 
23
 Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR II-2139. 
24
 Case T-49/04 Hassan v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR II-52. 
25
 By virtue of emergency powers pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC has 
adopted financial sanctions directly against named individuals. UNSC Resolutions 1267 (1999), 
1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002), as subsequently amended, place an obligation on states to freeze 
without delay any financial assets or economic resources of the suspects. 
26
 The The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, established by UNSC Res 1267 (15 
October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267, is one of the three subsidiary bodies of the Security 
Council addressing terrorism-related issues, and its membership reflects the composition of the 
Council.  
 examination depends on the initiative of a State in the Committee to place the 
issue on the Committee’s agenda. Moreover, the decision is reviewed by the 
same body which originally imposed the sanction, and following purely 
intergovernmental consultations. Furthermore, individuals only have access to 
the portion of their file that the designating state considers to be publicly 
disclosable and they are at no time entitled to take part in the procedures.27  
 
Before the adoption of Council Regulation 1286/2009 in December 2009, EU 
institutions automatically endorsed the lists, and the measure was implemented 
without an ex post facto hearing, insofar as EU delisting entirely depended 
upon UN delisting.28 Targeted individuals challenged the relevant acts before 
the CFI, on the grounds that they breached, inter alia , fair trial rights and the 
right to an effective remedy. In the afore-mentioned rulings Yusuf, Kadi, Ayadi 
and Hassan, the CFI found that the combined effect of Articles 25 and 103 of 
the UN Charter gave priority to UN Security Council resolutions adopted under 
Chapter VII over any conflicting treaty obligation, including human rights 
treaties or the EC Treaty.29 The court also considered that Community 
institutions, bound by the Treaty to further the international obligations of 
                                                 
27
 See the ‘Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work’, adopted on 7 November 
2002, as amended on 10 April 2003, 21 December 2005, 29 November 2006, 12 February 2007, 
and 9 December 2008 <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf> [1], 
[3], [6], [7].  
28
 In order to give effect to UNSC’s resolutions, the EU Council adopted Common Position 
2002/402/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-
Qaida organization and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with them, implemented by EC Regulation 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, as amended. 
29
 See e.g. (n 21) [231]. 
 member states, had no autonomous discretion to alter the contents of the UN 
resolutions; thus, any judicial review of the implementing measures would have 
amounted to review of the UN sanction itself, which fell outside that court’s 
jurisdiction.30  
 
The findings of the CFI were heavily determined by the authority of the UN 
Charter, and concerns related to the lack of jurisdiction to review Security 
Council resolutions. In rulings occasioned by analogous sanctions adopted by 
EU institutions autonomously, such as Organisation des Modjahedines du 
peuple d’Iran of 12 December 2006,31 and Sison32 and Stichting Al-Aqsa33 of 11 
July 2007, the CFI stated that in order for the restrictive measure to comply 
with respect for defence rights, suspects must be informed of the reasons 
leading to the measure immediately after its adoption, afforded a hearing if 
requested, and given access to the information in their file so that they may 
express their views thereon. 
 
                                                 
30
 Ibid [265], [276]. 
31
 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d’Iran v Council of the European 
Union [2007] All E.R. (EC) 447. See also CFI decision of 4 December 2008, case T-284/08 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council of the European Union [2009] 1 CMLRev 
44. 
32
 Case T-47/03 Sison v Council of the European Union [2007] 3 CMLRev. 39. 
33
 Case T-327/03 Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council of the European Union [2007] ECR II-79. 
 A posture akin to CFI’s analysis of UN dictated sanctions was espoused by the 
UK House of Lords in Al-Jedda in 2007,34 a case regarding prolonged 
confinement without trial by British forces in Iraq by virtue of the power to 
detain conferred by a Chapter VII resolution. The House of Lords found that 
Security Council resolutions prevail over any other treaty, and therefore UN 
obligations qualify the individual right to liberty enshrined in Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).35   
 
Arguably, the practice of UN member States (including judicial practice) has 
further contributed to the verticalization of the international legal order, 
subordinating inter-state agreements to the Charter and to the undisputed 
authority of the UN body with the widest mandatory powers. 
 
 
II. THE KADI RULING AND JUDICIAL ECHOES (OTHMAN, AYADI 
AND HASSAN): DE-VERTICALIZING THE NTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
 
Despite the wide acceptance of its constitutional value as the foundation of 
current international relations, the UN Charter’s value and the unrestrained 
                                                 
34
 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, on 
appeal from R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA 
Civ 327. 
35
 Ibid [30]-[36]. 
 authority of the Security Council demand rethinking in the light of the recent 
EU reactions to the UN sanctions regime. These reactions indicate that the 
emergence of institutionalized self-contained regimes might pose a major 
challenge to UN global governance. 
 
The notion of self-contained regime, coined by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) in the Wimbledon case,36 designates an international 
arrangement based on a set of special rules applying with priority over general 
law, a ‘strong form of lex specialis’;37 it encompasses, however, a variety of 
situations, from a set of secondary norms governing the consequences of a 
breach of a primary norm in derogation of responsibility law38 to ‘interrelated 
wholes of primary and secondary rules, sometimes also referred to as “systems” 
or “subsystems” of rules that cover some particular problem differently from 
the way it would be covered under general law’.39 The definition adopted by the 
                                                 
36
 S.S. Wimbledon (1923) PCIJ Series A, No 1, 23-4. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
identified such a special regime in diplomatic law: ‘diplomatic law itself provides the necessary 
means of defence against, and sanctions for, illicit activities by members of diplomatic or 
consular missions’ therefore violation of diplomatic immunities is not lawful as a counter-
measure (see Case of Tehran Hostages (US v Iran), [1980] ICJ Rep 38 [83]).  For the ICJ the 
rules on diplomatic protection constitute a ‘self-contained regime’ (ibi. [86]) and based on lex 
specialis derogat legi generali such rules prevail on general rules on counter-measures. The 
Koskenniemi Report, while acknowledging that EU law is sometimes treated as a self-contained 
regime insofar as ‘rules of general international law are assumed to be modified or even 
excluded in [its] administration’ ([129]), discusses EU integration under the regionalization 
heading, as a ‘technique of law-making’ (ibid., 89, [205]); see specifically, on European 
integration, ibid 95-6 [218]-[219].   
37
 Koskenniemi Report (n 1) 55 [123].  
38
 Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(2001) acknowledges that the general rules on State responsibility ‘do not apply where and to 
the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content 
or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of 
international law’. 
39
 Koskenniemi Report (n 1) 57 [128].  
 ILC describes the self-contained regime as a ‘group of rules and principles 
concerned with a particular subject matter’ and ‘applicable as lex speciali’.40 
The EU is arguably one of the most advanced forms of subsystem: it is an 
institutionalized self-contained regime, based on both primary rules and rules of 
responsibility established by the founding treaty rather than by international 
law, having its own institutions to administer the relevant rules and monitored 
by specific tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies. Naturally, no regime is 
completely self-contained insofar as it depends on general rules to operate (law 
of treaties etc.), and where there is no special regulation of a matter, general law 
still plays a residual role.41 Also, the EU is still subject to the rules of 
international law in relation to third parties (e.g. in connection with 
responsibility for breach of UN law vis-à-vis non-EU States).  
 
The 2008 ECJ Kadi judgment redefined the relationship between European and 
international law from a dualist perspective, with a strong emphasis on the 
autonomous nature of the EU legal order. The court underlined that ‘an 
international agreement (such as the UN Charter) cannot affect the . . . 
autonomy of the Community legal system’.42 According to the ECJ, the 
European legal order comprises non-derogable fundamental principles, such as 
                                                 
40
 ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1) [13]. 
41
 Koskenniemi Report (n 1) 77-83 [172]-[190]; 84-5, [192]-[193]. See also B Simma and D 
Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law (2006)17 
EJIL 483. 
42
 Kadi and Al-Barakaat (n 4)[282].  
 the rule of law and fundamental human rights.43 Thus, international obligations 
cannot be accommodated to the extent that they impair those principles that 
‘form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order’.44 The system 
is also endowed with autonomous mechanisms designed to ensure that those 
principles are enforced, in particular judicial review. Protection of fundamental 
rights therefore includes for the Court ‘the review by the Community judicature 
of the lawfulness of Community measures as regards their consistency with 
those fundamental rights’.45 
 
Consequently, the ECJ found the power to review the EC regulations giving 
effect to UN mandatory resolutions within its jurisdiction, insofar as the 
constitutional guarantee of judicial review ‘stemming from the EC Treaty as an 
autonomous legal system…is not to be prejudiced by an international 
agreement’.46 Enquiring whether comparable supervision exists at UN level, so 
as to justify the court’s refraining from review, the ECJ found (despite 
announcing that it does not review UN measures) that UN re-examination 
mechanisms infringe the procedural rights of suspects.47 As a result, the ECJ 
annulled the asset-freeze regulation insofar as it concerned the applicant: 
Security Council resolutions conflicting with non-derogable EC principles 
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 cannot be enforced.48 This amounts to asserting that UN law needs to pass the 
test of EC legitimacy in order to be implemented in the EU legal space. 
 
The ruling thus challenged the presumption of absolute primacy of UN 
obligations fostered by Article 103 of the UN Charter. The Kadi court did not 
question the primacy of the UN Charter over any other treaty and recognized 
the requirement for the EC to ‘respect international law in the exercise of its 
powers’.49 The court claimed, nevertheless, that compliance with UN law 
cannot go so far as to interfere with those principles representing the very 
foundation of the EU. This is ultimately equivalent to a finding that Article 103 
does not supersede every conflicting obligation arising under a different treaty. 
For the ECJ, the norms relating to the protection of human rights or regulating 
the checks and balances within the EU cannot be displaced.  
 
Arguably, the European subsystem has reached a level of integration such that 
it has generated its own jus cogens. The court’s reasoning, distant from any 
recognition of UN global governance and international public order, is 
concerned with the intransgressible European public order, based on the rule of 
law and fundamental human rights.50 The judgment therefore balances UN law 
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 as mere treaty obligation against EU norms as constitutional principles. The 
court stresses, at the same time, that the power of review only concerns the 
domestic implementation measures, not the original resolutions, and that such 
review does not entail any challenge to the supremacy of UN decisions.51 
However, a finding of illegitimacy leading to delisting by the EU institutions in 
spite of the decision of the Sanctions Committee can only mean that UN law 
has lost its primacy.  
 
It is important to appreciate that the Kadi ruling has not remained in isolation. 
The recent jurisprudence of the EU courts has already confirmed the revisited 
relationship between EU and UN law. On the one hand, the CFI has adjusted its 
jurisprudence to the Kadi principles. In its decision Othman v Council and 
Commission of 11 June 2009,52 the CFI found that the EU Council ‘at no time 
informed the applicant of the evidence adduced against him,’53 denying him a 
chance to defend himself and obtain a legal remedy.54 As did the ECJ in Kadi, 
the CFI annulled the EU regulation insofar as it related to the applicant, and it 
expressly observed that the applicant found himself ‘in a factual and legal 
situation in every way comparable to that of Mr Kadi’.55 Again similarly to the 
ECJ’s decision, the CFI noted that, because the grounds for applying the 
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 regulation were not disclosed to the court, no review of its lawfulness was 
possible, which amounted to a violation of ‘the fundamental right to an 
effective legal remedy’.56 The CFI therefore concluded that the Council adopted 
the regulation in breach of Mr Othman’s fundamental rights, in particular rights 
of the defence, the right to effective judicial review and the right to property.57  
 
Further actions seeking annulment of Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
881/2002 of 27 May 2002, as amended, are currently under consideration: Al-
Faqih v Council,58 Sanabel Relief Agency v Council,59 Abdrabbah v Council60 
and Nasuf v Council.61 These actions, all brought on 5 May 2006, contain the 
same pleas in law and largely rely on the same main arguments. The applicants 
allege that Article 2 of Regulation No 881/2002 as amended infringes 
fundamental principles of Community law, inter alia respect for fundamental 
rights. Other replicas of Kadi can therefore be expected. 
 
On the other hand, the ECJ itself has maintained the approach taken in Kadi.  
The recent judgment in the joint appeal cases of Ayadi and Hassan issued on 3 
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 December 200962 essentially follows the findings in Kadi. We can state that by 
now a consistent pattern of jurisprudence upholding the rule of law and human 
rights has developed at EU level against the background of authoritative UN 
counter-terrorism strategies. 
 
The implementation of UN sanctions in the EU was again put to the test by new 
claims filed with the CFI by Al Barakaat on 30 January 200963 and by Mr Kadi 
on 26 February 2009,64 seeking to obtain, insofar as they are concerned, the 
annulment of the Regulation No 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008 by which the 
Commission decided to maintain them on the list.65 The applicants contend that 
the new regulation violated their defence rights (the right to an effective hearing 
and the right to effective judicial protection) and failed to remedy the 
infringements found by the ECJ in its 2008 judgment in that respect. They 
claim that the contested regulation provides no procedure for communicating 
the evidence on which the assets-freeze decision was based, or for enabling 
them to comment meaningfully on that evidence. The applicants further submit 
that the Commission failed to provide compelling reasons for maintaining the 
asset freeze, and failed to undertake an assessment of all relevant facts and 
circumstances in deciding whether to enact the contested regulation.  
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It remains to be seen if the CFI finds that the substance of the narrative 
summaries of reasons for listing provided by the Commission contains 
information sufficiently precise on the alleged collaboration with terrorists for 
the measure to be compliant with the duty to state reasons and defence rights.66 
If not, the transparency and fairness of the current listing procedure will also be 
challenged. If the court decides that it needs to perform a full review of the 
case, assessing the evidence supporting inclusion on the UN list, and if the 
Sanctions Committee shows itself unwilling to reveal that information because 
of the sensitive nature of its source (intelligence or police information),67 the 
court may decide that it is prevented from reviewing the case, which amounts to 
a breach of the right to effective remedy. The CFI certainly did not seem 
impressed by the confidentiality argument in the 2008 judgment in People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran regarding autonomous EU lists: ‘the Court 
considers that the Council is not entitled to base its funds-freezing decision on 
information or material in the file communicated by a Member State, if the said 
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 Member State is not willing to authorise its communication to the Community 
judicature whose task is to review the lawfulness of that decision’.68 The Tenth 
Report of the Monitoring Team assisting the Sanctions Committee rightly noted 
with concern the latest legal challenges:  
 
When the process of judgement and appeal is completed, the resulting 
decision in these two cases has the potential to create significant 
difficulties for all member States of the European Union and may alter 
the terms of the wider discussion of the fairness of the regime and the 
need for reform.69  
 
 
III. COUNCIL REGULATION 1286/2009 INTRODUCING DUE 
PROCESS PROVISIONS: ARE SECURITY COUNCIL 
BLACKLISTING DECISIONS STILL MANDATORY? 
 
The Kadi judgement has also triggered unforeseen institutional responses at the 
EU level. The first reactions to the judgment were rather modest, and left room 
for speculation as to the intent of EU institutions to safeguard a façade of 
legality while complying with UN decisions in the same indiscriminating 
manner. The Presidency of the Council approached the Sanctions Committee, 
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 which provided narrative summaries of reasons for listing, and the Commission 
made them available to Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat. After having considered 
comments received from the two parties, the Commission passed Regulation 
1190/2008 of 28 November 2008, reconfirming their inclusion on the list, and 
thus deciding to continue the restrictive measures. On the other hand, on 30 
December 2008 the European Commission published a notice for the attention 
of the persons and entities added to the list by the latest EC Regulations to 
advise them that they may request the grounds for their listing from the 
Commission, and challenge the regulations concerned before the CFI.70  
 
More significantly, on 22 April 2009 the Commission advanced a proposal for 
amendments to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, aimed 
at the inclusion of due process provisions in accordance with the Kadi 
judgment.71 In the Explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal, the 
Commission clarifies that the new procedure for implementing UN sanctions is 
to be based on the procedure applied in the implementation of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 concerning the terrorist 
list drawn up by the EU itself. The reform would thus remove the difference in 
the treatment of suspected individuals based on the mere origin (EU or UN) of 
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 the list.72 Under the Commission’s proposal, upon notification by the UN 
Sanctions Committee of a new listing decision and receipt of the statement of 
reasons, the Commission would provisionally freeze the assets of the party 
concerned, while at the same time sending them a statement of reasons and 
inviting their views. Finally, aided by an advisory committee, the Commission 
would examine the views and adopt a final decision confirming or rescinding 
the provisional freeze.73  
 
Council Regulation No 1286/2009 of 22 December 200974 amended Regulation 
(EC) No 881/2002 pursuant to the Commission’s proposal. Point (9) of the new 
regulation, inserting a new Article 7 (a), is of particular significance for the 
interplay between the EU and the UN:  
 
1. Where the United Nations Security Council or the Sanctions 
Committee decides to list a natural or legal person…the Commission 
shall, as soon as a statement of reasons has been provided by the 
                                                 
72
 As recalled in Section II, the CFI had also developed a double pattern of review based on the 
origin of the list. 
73
 COM (2009)187 final [8]: ‘The following Articles 7a to 7e are inserted: ‘Article 7a 1. Where 
the United Nations Security Council or the Sanctions Committee decides to list a natural or 
legal person, entity, body or group for the first time, the Commission shall, as soon as a 
statement of reasons has been provided by the United Nations, take a provisional decision on 
the amendment of Annex I without delay. 2. Once the provisional decision referred to in 
paragraph 1 has been taken, the Commission shall without delay communicate the statement of 
reasons provided by the United Nations, to the person, entity, body or group concerned, either 
directly or through the publication of a notice, providing him, her or it an opportunity to express 
his, her or its views on the matter. 3. The Commission shall take a final decision concerning the 
person, entity, body or group concerned in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
7b(2)’.  
74
 Council Regulation (EC) 1286/2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing 
certain restrictive measures [2009] OJ L346/42. 
 Sanctions Committee, take a decision to include such person … in 
Annex 1.75 2. Once the [Commission’s] decision…has been taken, the 
Commission shall without delay communicate the statement of reasons 
provided by the Sanctions Committee, to the person, entity, body or 
group concerned,…providing him, her or it an opportunity to express 
his, her or its views on the matter. 3. Where observations are submitted, 
the Commission shall review its decision…in the light of those 
observations….Those observations shall be forwarded to the Sanctions 
Committee. The Commission shall communicate the result of its review 
to the person, entity, body or group concerned. The result of the review 
shall also be forwarded to the Sanctions Committee.  
 
The text is somewhat elusive and does not provide a definitive solution in the 
event that the Commission does not consider the designation justified, but the 
Sanctions Committee insists on maintaining the name on the list. The 
implication seems to be, however, that the Commission is the final arbiter of the 
case: it ‘communicates’ its decision to the Sanctions Committee after having 
reviewed the case, and apparently no further action is expected from the 
Sanctions Committee, nor is there any navette system envisaged, allowing the 
two institutions to reach a concerted decision; the Sanctions Committee is, in 
fact, merely notified. To put it differently, the decisions of the Sanctions 
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 Committee designating suspects and imposing freezing measures are no longer 
treated as mandatory! The UN listing decisions are considered as prima facie 
appropriate listing proposals, nevertheless open to scrutiny, and the ultimate 
decision on the merits is reserved to the EU Commission, following an 
examination of the defence put forward by the suspect. The consequences of the 
new regulation cannot be overstated: not only is there no automatic compliance 
with the SC resolutions, but it may lead to a decision to annul a freezing order 
plainly in contrast with UN Charter obligations. 
 
Clearly, the opposition to a UN sanctions regime insufficiently wary of human 
rights has now moved from the judiciary to the forefront of EU political 
institutions. The new Council regulation puts an end to the passive 
implementation of measures which impinge upon fundamental individual rights 
as protected by EU law. The possibility to rescind the freezing order 
demonstrates that the EU is no longer a submissive receptor of UN decisions: 
the vertical relationship between the EU and the UN is no longer endorsed. 
 
IV. THE OMBUDSPERSON AND THE NEW DELISTING 
PROCEDURE IN SC RES 1904 (2009): A DISAPPOINTING ATTEMPT  
AT PRESERVING AUTHORITY BY ENHANCING ACCEPTANCE 
 
The latest resolution of the UN Security Council concerning individual 
sanctions, Res 1904 (2009) of 17 December 2009, introduces a series of 
 amendments in response to the criticism of the current listing and delisting 
procedures. As specified in the Preamble, the adoption of this further reform of 
the sanctions mechanism was partly driven by the legal challenges faced by 
domestic implementation measures, and the desire to improve the judicial 
guarantees available to suspects.76  
 
Most significantly, the resolution establishes a new delisting mechanism 
centred on the institution of the Ombudsperson, an independent expert 
appointed on the basis of high professional qualifications and moral integrity.77 
The Office of the Ombudsperson will completely replace the Focal point for 
delisting, whose activity will be limited to receiving delisting requests in 
connection with other sanctions lists.78 The establishment of an independent 
body for the review of delisting petitions, as requested by the critics of the 
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 existing mechanism,79 can only be welcomed. Nevertheless, the role assigned to 
the Ombudsperson in the procedure, as defined in the Annex II of the 
resolution, is utterly disappointing.  
 
The procedure commences with a two-month period of information gathering, 
extendable to four months if states need additional time to provide information. 
During this period, the Ombudsperson informs the petitioner about the 
Committee’s procedures, forwards the delisting request to the members of the 
Committee, designating state(s), state(s) of residence and nationality/ 
incorporation, and any UN bodies or other states deemed relevant, asking them 
to provide any appropriate additional information concerning the delisting 
request.80 At the end of the period of information gathering, the Ombudsperson 
presents a written update to the Sanctions Committee on the progress of the 
case, including details regarding which states have supplied information.  
 
The second phase of the procedure consists of a two-month period of dialogue 
(also extendable to four months) in which the Ombudsperson facilitates the 
exchange of information between the petitioner, the Sanctions Committee, and 
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 the States concerned. The Ombudsperson can ask the petitioner questions or 
request additional information or clarifications that may help the Committee’s 
consideration of the request (including any questions or information requests 
received from relevant states, the Committee and the Monitoring Team), 
forwards replies from the petitioner back to relevant states, the Committee and 
the Monitoring Team, and follows up with the petitioner. Upon completion of 
this period of dialogue, the Ombudsperson, with the help of the Monitoring 
Team, drafts and circulates to the Committee a ‘Comprehensive Report’ that 
‘exclusively’ summarizes and specifies the sources of all information available 
(respecting confidential elements of Member States’ communications with the 
Ombudsperson), describes the Ombudsperson’s activities with respect to this 
delisting request, including dialogue with the petitioner, and, based on an 
analysis of all the information available, lays out for the Committee the 
principal arguments concerning the delisting request.81 
 
The reformed procedure modestly culminates with the ‘Committee Discussion 
and Decision’. After the Committee has had thirty days to review the 
Comprehensive Report, the delisting request is placed on the Committee’s 
agenda for consideration.82 The Ombudsperson presents the report in person 
and responds to questions from members of the Committee.83 Significantly, the 
decision whether to approve the delisting request is taken by the Committee 
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 ‘through its normal decision-making procedures’.84 The Ombudsperson is 
informed of the decision, and in turn informs the petitioner; when applicable, he 
or she removes the name from the list.85  
 
The only substantial improvement introduced by the procedure is that it 
apparently guarantees the review of the case, regardless of the initiative of a 
State in the Committee. Other positive developments are enhanced 
transparency, because of the better coordination of the information exchange 
between the petitioner, the Committee and any other relevant parties, and the 
quasi-interlocutory phase (the applicant has an opportunity to respond, 
indirectly, to the questions addressed by any member of the Committee). That 
said, the new procedure does not notable alter the decision-making mechanism: 
the delisting decision is made by the same political body according to the same 
rules. The Ombudsperson’s report is not in the form of a decision on the case, 
as it merely summarizes arguments and evidence, and whatever his or her 
findings, the report is in no way binding. Also, the presence of the 
Ombudsperson when the Committee considers the case should not be 
overestimated, because the Ombudsperson does not act as defence proxy for the 
petitioner, but rather as an objective rapporteur. 
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 Compared to the reforms suggested by governmental and independent 
experts,86 the amendments introduced by Resolution 1904 (2009) definitely 
appear unambitious. However, the concern for further adjusting the procedures 
in the aftermath of important legal challenges to the sanctions regime (in 
particular the Kadi ruling)87 testifies the Security Council’s awareness that non-
compliance by major international players will lead to a decrease in UN 
authority. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS: EU AND UN, CONFLICT RATHER THAN 
COLLABORATION? 
 
The reality of self-contained regimes is not novel. The ECJ had long established 
in historical judgments that the EC Treaty is ‘more than an international 
agreement’ and has created ‘a new legal order’,88 ‘its own legal system’,89 ‘a 
Community based on the rule of law inasmuch as neither its Member States nor 
its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted 
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 by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’.90 
However, the previous case law suggesting the self-contained nature of the EC/ 
EU legal order was inward-oriented, reshaping the obligations of member states 
and institutions in their mutual relationship and vis-à-vis individuals. The 
novelty of Kadi is the outward-oriented emphasis on the autonomy and 
specialty of EU law, preventing the operation of international rules with regard 
to third parties.  
 
What is most striking in Kadi and in the subsequent developments in EU 
legislation is that, while initially designed to accommodate UN obligations, this 
special regime places itself in conflict rather than continuity with UN law. 
Article 307 of the EC Treaty was introduced to safeguard the precedence of UN 
obligations.91 Also, Article 10 A of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly confirms that 
the EU is expected to function in agreement with the UN Charter:  
 
1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement:…democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for 
human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for 
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 the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law….[The Union] shall promote multilateral solutions to common 
problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. 
(emphasis added). 
 
Notwithstanding this general outlook, Kadi and post-Kadi events suggest that 
the relationship between the UN and self-contained regimes is not necessarily 
based on the latter’s subordination to the former. Despite the conciliatory 
language of the 2008 Kadi judgment, the emerging doctrine sees the 
relationship between the EU and the UN through the lens of conflict.92 This 
tension, widely confirmed by the new Council regulation, suggests that the role 
of UN law as a constitutional framework for international relations may be little 
more than a myth. It is yet difficult to predict how the EU reform of the 
mechanism giving effect to UN sanctions will work in practice. What appears 
clear is that the actual implementation of UN lists will face a double challenge: 
the filter of the EU Commission’s revision of the grounds for listing, and a 
possible decision by the EU courts annulling the implementing regulation. Non-
compliance with Security Council decisions pursuant to the new EU legislation 
and/ or to CFI rulings on the merits will weaken the authority of UN decisions 
and, possibly, the collaborative relationship between the UN and other treaty-
                                                 
92
 The court acknowledges that, on the international plane, UN obligations are hierarchically 
superior, but states that within the EU fundamental EU principles take precedence. This implies 
that international obligations will not be given effect unless consistent with EU obligations, 
which reduces the recognition of UN primacy to a ‘theoretical concession’. See Draghici (n 4) 
657. 
 based regimes. Further instances of defiance are in fact likely to occur based on 
the same concerns,93 as the EU example might encourage other legislatures to 
scrutinize UN decisions, and other courts to renounce judicial self-restraint in 
cases challenging UN-imposed measures.94  
 
The Kadi doctrine avows that EU constitutionalism supersedes UN 
constitutionalism. This contradicts the ILC’s findings that, where the principle 
of harmonious interpretation cannot reconcile an obligation under the Charter 
with a conflicting treaty obligation, the hierarchically superior norm (the one 
triggered by the operation of Article 103) prevails.95 Apparently, where Article 
103 enters into competition with the highest-rank principles of a self-contained 
regime, priority will be given to the ‘local’ Grundnorm, which is closer to the 
community and protects its fundamental values.96 For that reason the law of the 
international community as embodied in UN law and institutions has to attach 
greater weight to values (human rights, rule of law) if it purports to become an 
                                                 
93
 See Tenth Report of the Monitoring Team (n 69) [35]: “As to the fairness and transparency of 
the regime, the perception remains in many States that it still lacks appropriate protection of 
individual rights, despite the publication of narrative summaries of reasons for listing and the 
Committee’s review of the appropriateness of all listings. It is important to deal with the 
continued criticism of the fairness and transparency of the regime, so as to allow the Committee 
to turn its attention more fully to countering the threat from Al-Qaida and the Taliban”. 
94
 A claim brought by Youssef Mustapha Nada Ebada against Switzerland is pending before the 
European Court of Human Rights, following a ruling by the Swiss Federal Tribunal that 
upholds the sanctions measures against him based on the UN designation. See Nineth Report of 
the Monitoring Team 12, [24]. The recent views of the Human Rights Committee in the case of 
Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v Belgium (Communication No 1472/2006, 22 October 2008), 
finding a breach of Articles 12 and 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in relation to the authors’ presence on UN terrorist lists, may also induce the Court to 
take a rights-favourable approach. 
95
 ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1)[42]. 
96
 No choice-of-norm would be possible if Article 103 were recognized as jus cogens, in fact 
special regimes are not allowed to derogate from general law when the latter amounts to jus 
cogens. See Koskenniemi Report (n 1) 84 [191]. 
 authentic global governance.97 Otherwise, as the Kadi saga proves, subsystems 
having developed a constitutional dimension based on non-derogable norms 
may invoke their own ordre public to deny compliance with UN resolutions, 
frustrating UN aspirations to universal governance. 
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international human rights and rule-of-law standards in terms of access to justice and fair trial. 
